Royal Institute of Philosophy

As mentioned in the previous post, I have some catching up to do on the last semester’s Philosophy events at Keele. I will start with the RIP Lectures and will continue, in the next post, with the Forum for Philosophical Research Annual Lecture and Conference, as well as the meetings of the reading group.

However, I cannot begin without mentioning the next RIP invited lecture: Tuesday, 8 February, from 6 to 7.30, in CBA0.060 (Chancellor’s Building, Keele University), Katerina Deligiorgi (Sussex) will give a paper on Kant’s Freedoms. As usually, there will be wine and all are welcome to attend! An abstract of the paper is pasted below.

On 7 December 2010, James Tartaglia (Keele) gave a talk on Two Approaches to the Problem of Consciousness.  Before that, on 2 November, William Child (Oxford) offered an lecture on Knowing from One’s Own Case. On 18 October, the presentation was given by Richard Gray (Cardiff). He talked about The Perceptual Representation of Natural Kind Properties. Finally, the first paper of the series was Sophie Allen‘s, What Matters in (Naturalised) Metaphysics. She visited from Oxford on 4 October 2010.

Katerina Deligiorgi (Sussex): Kant’s Freedoms


Questions that are central to contemporary debates about freedom of action and autonomy, including whether availability of alternative possibilities to the agent is necessary for moral responsibility and whether a theory of autonomy requires that the choice of ends be subject to direct normative constraints can be usefully addressed within Kant’s theory of freedom. The problem is that this theory hinges on the concept of transcendental freedom, which has proved recalcitrant to interpretation. If we accept it, we get three freedoms -alternative possibilities, substantive autonomy and transcendental freedom- for the price of one -transcendental freedom-, but many consider the price as simply too high. In this paper I offer two interpretations of the concept: as a  power and as a source, opting for the latter as the preferred option.


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