The Forum for Philosophical Research at The School of Politics, IR & Philosophy (SPIRE) and the Research Centre for SPIRE, University of Keele, invites you all to the next 2012/13 Royal Institute of Philosophy Lecture:
Dr Daniel Whiting (University of Southampton)
6 November 2012, 6-7.30 pm, CBA0.060, Chancellor’s Building, Keele University
All Welcome! Wine!
Suppose that someone has a ticket in the National Lottery. Suppose also that she believes (fully, flat-out) that her ticket will lose. This belief seems irrational – if the subject really thinks that her ticket is going to lose, why did she buy it in the first place and why does she bother to keep it (though, of course, it would be very silly to throw the ticket away)? It can seem puzzling that such a belief is irrational, since it is highly probable that the ticket will in fact lose, and so that the belief is true. In this paper, I offer a novel account of why so-called lottery beliefs are not rational, one which appeals to the idea that belief is fundamentally governed by a norm of truth.
About the Speaker:
Daniel Whiting is a Senior Lecturer at the University of Southampton. He works primarily in epistemology, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of language. He has published a number of articles in these areas and is the editor of The Later Wittgenstein on Language.