First 2017 Royal Institute of Philosophy Invited Lecture
THE KEELE-OXFORD-ST ANDREWS KANTIAN (KOSAK) RESEARCH CENTRE &
THE FORUM FOR PHILOSOPHICAL RESEARCH @
THE SCHOOL OF POLITICS, PHILOSOPHY, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND ENVIRONMENT (SPIRE), KEELE UNIVERSITY
Invites you all to the first 2017 Royal Institute of Philosophy Lecture
Idealism and the Autonomy of the Human Sciences
By: Paul Giladi (Sheffield), Alexis Papazoglou(Royal Holloway) and Giuseppina D’Oro (Keele)
On: Tuesday, 7 February
From: 6-7.30 pm
In: CBA0.060, Chancellor’s Building, Keele University
All Welcome! Wine
Much philosophy of mind has been governed by the question “How can mind fit in the natural world?” The question betrays two important assumptions. First, that if the mental conflicts with the natural there is at least an obligation to try and rescue the mental by showing that it can somehow be placed in the realm of nature. The second assumption is that any attempt to rescue the mental must do so in such a way as not to rock the naturalistic picture of reality whose endorsement gives rise to the problem that the question “How can mind fit in the natural world?” gives expression to: the location problem.
In this paper we will argue that the so-called “location problem” arises because of the endorsement of a set of metaphilosophical assumptions concerning the role of philosophical analysis and its relation to science. We will argue that the conception of philosophy as a second order enquiry offering a reflection on the methodological practices of the special sciences, which is typically found in the Kantian and post-Kantian idealist tradition, gives rise to a form of non-reductivism which succeeds in doing justice to the autonomy of the mental without incurring the compromises and encountering the obstacles that face many twentieth century attempts to argue for the autonomy of the mental from a naturalistic platform.
Paul Giladi, Alexis Papazoglou and Giuseppina D’Oro are currently invertigators on a Templeton funded project, Idealism and the Philosophy of Mind. If you would like to know more about the background of this paper you can follow the project “Idealism and the Philosophy of Mind” here: https://idealismsite.wordpress.com/
About the Speaker: Paul Giladi is currently an honorary research fellow at the University of Sheffield. He has several articles in journals and edited collections on German idealism, pragmatism, and contemporary analytic philosophy. He is also the co-investigator of the Templeton-funded project “Idealism and the Philosophy of Mind” (2016–17), the co-editor of the 2017 special issue of Inquiry on Idealism and the Metaphilosophy of Mind, the co-editor of the 2017 special issue of Hegel Bulletin on Hegel and the Frankfurt School, the co-editor of the 2018 special issue of Hegel Bulletin on Hegel and 20th-Century French Philosophy, the co-editor of the 2018 special issue of European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy on Idealism and Pragmatism, and the editor of Responses to Naturalism: Critical Perspectives from Idealism and Pragmatism (Routledge, 2019).
Alexis Papazoglou is lecturer in philosophy at Royal Holloway, University of London. Before that he was an affiliated lecturer in the faculty of philosophy, University of Cambridge. His research focuses on the way the post-Kantian tradition understands the relationship between nature and mind, and the scope of scientific explanations, as a way of illuminating contemporary debates surrounding naturalism. He is a co-investigator on the two-year project ‘Idealism and the Philosophy of Mind’, part of the University of Cambridge based project ‘New Directions in the Study of Mind’. He is also the secretary for the Hegel Society of Great Britain. His publications include articles on the relationship between Hegel’s philosophy and naturalism*, and he is also the editor of The Pursuit of Philosophy: Some Cambridge Perspectives.
Giuseppina D’Oro is Reader in Philosophy at Keele University. Her research interests lie at the intersection between idealism, philosophy of mind and metaphilosophy. She is the author of Collingwood and the Metaphysics of Experience, the editor of the new edition of Collingwood’s An Essay on Philosophical Method (with James Connelly), of Reasons and Causes: Causalism and Anti-Causalism in the Philosophy of Action (with Constantine Sandis) and of The Cambridge Companion to Philosophical Methodology (with Soren Overgaard). She has published many papers on Collingwood’s contribution to philosophical methodology and action theory.