RIP
Royal Institute of Philosophy

THE KEELE-OXFORD-ST ANDREWS KANTIAN (KOSAK) RESEARCH CENTRE &

THE FORUM FOR PHILOSOPHICAL RESEARCH @
THE SCHOOL OF POLITICS, PHILOSOPHY, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND ENVIRONMENT (SPIRE)
KEELE UNIVERSITY
Invites you all to the following Royal Institute of Philosophy Lecture

The Subject of “We Intend”
 
By: Hans Bernhard Schmid (Vienna)
On: Tuesday, 21 February
From: 6-7.30 pm
In: CBA0.060, Chancellor’s Building, Keele University
 
All Welcome! Wine


Abstract:

This talk examines and compares the ways in which intentions of the singular kind (“I intend”) and the plural kind (“we intend”) are subjective. Are intentions of the plural kind ours in the same way intentions of the singular kind are mine? Starting with the singular case, it is argued that “I intend” is subjective in virtue of self-knowledge. Self-knowledge is special in that it is self-identifying, self-validating, self-committing, and self-authorizing. Moving to the plural form, it is argued that in spite of apparent differences, attitudes of the form “we intend” are subjective in the same way. The self-knowledge at work here is plural rather than singular. This supports a plural subject account of collective intentionality. It is argued that the worries sometimes raised in the literature against the metaphysical “spookiness” of plural subjects are due to a fundamental misconception of the way in which attitudes of either kind – singular and plural – are subjective.
About the speaker:
Hans Bernhard Schmid is Professor of Social and Political Philosophy at the University of Viena. He is a world-leading expert in collective intentionality, having published Subjekt, System, Diskurs (Kluwer 2000), Wir-Intentionalität (Karl Alber 2005), Plural Action (Springer 2009), (with David Schweikard) Kollective Intentionalität (Suhrkamp 2009), Moralische Integrität (Suhrkamp 2011), and having edited or co-edited Rationality and Commitment (OUP 2007), Concepts of Sharedness (Ontos 2008), Self-evaluation (Springer 2011) and Collective Epistemology (De Gruyter 2013).

 

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