Today, Tuesday, 12 March, we will have the final Royal Institute of Philosophy Invited Lecture for this academic year. The speaker will be Michelle Montague (Texas, Austin/Bristol) and details about the paper and speaker are below. Between my most recent post and this one, we had a busy schedule of events: Royal Institute of Philosophy lectures, meetings of the reading group on A. W. Moore’s The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics, and a special lecture organised by the Forum for Philosophical Research.
Soon we will be able to announce the speaker for this year’s ‘Jean-Jacques Rousseau’ Annual Lecture of the Keele Forum for Philosophical Research, as well as the theme for the annual conference. The meetings of the reading group will continue – on 20 March and 3 April. Other meetings of the group will be organised after the Easter break.
For those interested in joining the Philosophy Programme from 2013, the next Visit Day will be on 23 March 2013.
Michelle Montague (Texas, Austin/Bristol): The Intentionality and Phenomenology of Perception
CBA0.060, Chancellors’ Building, Keele University
Abstract: Many have argued that that there is a metaphysically intimate relationship between a mental state’s phenomenological properties, the properties it has in virtue of there being ‘something it is like’ to be in it, and its intentional properties, the properties it has in virtue of being about or of something. I will focus on the case of conscious perception. The central question of this paper is this: how do we specify this relationship in more detail? I will consider three competing theories, what I will call ‘Standard representationalism’, ‘Fregeanism’, and ‘Brentanianism’. What principally separates these theories—their main axis of disagreement—is their specification of the nature of the intentional content that co-varies with phenomenological content. I will argue in favour of the Brentanian view.
About the speaker: Michelle Montague received a Ph.D. in philosophy from the University of Colorado, Boulder in 2002. She is currently an Associate Professor at the University of Texas at Austin and a senior lecturer at the University of Bristol. Her primary interests are philosophy of mind, philosophy of language and metaphysics; recent publications include “The Access Problem” in U. Kriegel’s (ed) Phenomenal Intentionality (OUP), “The phenomenology of particularity” (2011) in T. Bayne and M. Montague (eds) Cognitive Phenomenology; “Recent work on Intentionality” (2011) in Analysis; “The Logic, Intentionality, and Phenomenology of Emotion” (2009) in Philosophical Studies; and “Against Propositionalism” (2007) in Nous.
5 February: RIP Lecture: Sam Coleman (Hertfordshire), Qualia and Awareness
6 February: Reading Group Meeting: Chapter 5 (on Kant) – presentation: Adnan Mihdin (audio recording will be posted here shortly)
12 February: RIP Lecture: Marcia Baron (St Andrews/Indiana, Bloomington), Reasonableness
20 February: Reading Group Meeting: Chapter 6 (On Fichte) – presentation: Sorin Baiasu (audio recording will be posted here shortly)
26 February: Special Forum Lecture: Artut Szutta (Gdnask), The Credibility of Moral Intuitions
26 February: RIP Lecture: Geoffrey Scarre (Durham), ‘Sapient Trouble-tombs’? Archeologists’ Moral Responsibilities Towards the Dead
6 March: Reading Group Meeting: Chapter 7 (on Hegel) – presentation: Stephen Leach (audio recording will be posted here shortly)